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Monetary and Fiscal Policies:
Ordinary Recessions and Financial Crises
Svetoslav Semov
Abstract
This paper uses two different samples to study the effects of monetary and fiscal
policies on the profiles of recessions and recoveries. Several results emerge
from the econometric analysis presented. First, monetary policy during ordinary
recessions and banking crises is a powerful tool with lasting effects that extend
to recovery growth rates. However, the effect of monetary policy during financial
crises is strongly diminished in the case of forbearance – banks left to function
despite being technically insolvent. Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is
reversed – it is a powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to
significantly affect recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions. Finally,
the policy response during past financial crisis does not seem to be particularly
expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is markedly procylcical, while
monetary policy is neutral. This is proposed as an alternative explanation to the
one usually given for the sluggishness of financial crises.
I.

Introduction
The Global Recession of 2008-09 sparked renewed interest in systemic

financial crises. A key observation, first documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart,
was that recessions associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly severe
and protracted (1999). Most of the work on financial crises has concentrated on
real-economy variables like output loss, length, depth etc. (Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009; Kannan, 2010; Claessens et al., 2004). The role of monetary and fiscal
policies in financial crises has not been extensively studied with the exception
of a 15-country study in the latest issue of the World Economic Outlook (IMF,
2009). It is possible that inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies are one
reason why recoveries associated with financial crises turn out to be particularly
severe. In addition, it might be that in those cases in which monetary policy was
appropriately used, its effectiveness was diminished because the monetary policy
transmission mechanism was impaired as a result of the stress in the banking
system (IMF, 2009a).
5

This paper attempts to empirically evaluate the effect of monetary and
fiscal policies in financial crises on the duration of the recession and the strength
of the recovery. It further tries to examine if the effectiveness of monetary policy is
dependent on the implementation of financial reforms. As a benchmark, recessions
are employed to evaluate the normal impact of monetary and fiscal policies on
recovery growth rates. Several results emerge from the econometric analysis
presented. First, expansionary monetary policy during ordinary recessions is a
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However,
fiscal policy does not seem to affect post-crisis growth. Second, expansionary
monetary policy during financial crises still has a positive but insignificant effect
on the strength of the recovery, while expansionary fiscal policy has a positive
and significant effect. Furthermore, these results are preserved in the analysis of
the duration of the recession. Some empirical evidence is provided that explains
the ineffectiveness of monetary policy by numerous cases of forbearance –
banks left to function despite being technically insolvent. Finally, fiscal policy in
financial crises seems to be markedly procyclical – the authorities cut government
consumption on average by 2.5 percent of GDP during the duration of the
downturn. Monetary policy, on the other hand, seems to be countercyclical – real
money market rates are decreased on average by once percent during the duration
of the downturn.
Two different samples are used. The first one uses quarterly data for a set
of seventy crises in nineteen developed countries to analyze the effect of the policy
response on the duration of the downturn and recovery growth rates. The second
one employs yearly data for a set of eighty financial crises episodes in different
countries to do the same. In addition, the impact of forbearance on monetary policy
is also estimated. In both cases, the goal is to use the variation in policy responses
and outcomes to find out the relationship between the variables of interest.
6

Eight sections follow. Section II reviews other cross country studies that
examine the profiles of recessions and recoveries associated with financial crises.
Section III presents a graphical interpretation of a linearized New Keynesian
model with a risk premium. Within this framework, I explain the difference
between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, I illustrate the
importance of monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, in Section III, I provide
a concise analysis of the policy response in twelve financial crises and I argue
that non-Keynesian policies are the norm rather than the exception. Section IV
specifies the econometric model to be used. In addition, it discusses alternative
versions of the model that should be estimated to check for the robustness of
results. Section V describes the data, on which the analysis will be based and its
sources. Section VI presents evidence on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal
policies in both ordinary recessions and financial crises and discusses the role of
forbearance on monetary policy effectiveness. Finally, Section VII concludes and
summarizes the results.
II.

Literature Review
This paper will attempt to add to the literature on cross-country studies of

financial countries. Most studies examining recoveries and recessions associated
with financial crises look at outcomes (output loss, duration of recession,
sluggishness of recovery) without explicitly answering the question what it is
that causes financial crises to be such protracted affairs. In addition, they do not
include the policy response in the analysis.
For example, Reinhart and Rogoff conduct a comparative historical analysis
of the aftermath of systemic financial crises (2008). The countries under
consideration are both developed and emerging economies that have experienced
financial distress in the after-war period. Reinhart and Rogoff’s analysis shows
7

deep and lasting effects on output and employment. Unemployment rises for
five years and output declines last on average for two years following the peak
of economic growth. This is substantially more than the length observed during
“normal recessions”. However, the authors do not provide any explanations for
why this might be the case. Their analysis is merely comparative.
Boysen-Hogrefe et al. use a parametric framework to test whether the size
of the bounce-back of GDP following an ordinary recession is larger than that
following a recession associated with a banking crisis or housing crisis. The study
covers 16 industrialized countries from 1970 to 2006. The results indicate that
the output loss during an ordinary recession is completely offset in the following
recovery. This is not the case when the recession was triggered by a banking crisis
or a housing crisis. Again, this study does not offer explanations for why this
might be the case – it simply makes this observation.
Kannan offers one possible reason why recoveries from banking crises
might be more protracted (2010). Using a sample of 21 industrialized economies
from 1970 to 2004, the author documents that it takes 5 ½ quarters for output to
recover following a banking crises, while it takes only 3 quarters following a normal
recession. Evidence is presented that stressed credit conditions are an important
factor containing the pace of the recovery. Industries that are more reliant on external
finance, or more subject to financial frictions, are found not to recover as fast as
other industries following all kinds of recession. The author finds strong evidence
that the differential growth patterns across industries is much more pronounced in
the aftermath of a financial crisis than it is for other recessions.
One potential drawback of this study is the small sample. The author
relies on just 15 financial crisis episodes, not all of which are systemic.
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There is another strand of literature that attempts to explain why some
financial crises are so prolonged. This strand analyzes the effect of financial
policies on the depth and duration of recessions. For example, Cecchetti et al.
explore a vast array of financial policies (liquidity support, deposit freeze, blanket
guarantee, bank holiday, forbearance etc.) and find that establishing an asset
management company is associated with shorter recessions (2009). Furthermore,
the authors find that forbearance is strongly associated with bigger output losses.
Other financial policies do not seem to have a significant effect on length, depth
and cumulative output losses during recessions associated with financial crises.
Also, Claessens et al. find that that excessive fiscal outlays delay economic
recovery.The fiscal outlay figure includes both fiscal and quasi-fiscal outlays for
financial system restructuring, including the recapitalization costs for banks, bailout
costs related to the government covering obligations due to depositors and creditors,
and debt relief schemes for bank borrowers. Furthermore, better institutional
framework, as characterized by less corruption and greater judicial efficiency, does
reduce output losses, even when controlling for excessive fiscal outlays.
In summary, the literature on financial policies might explain why some
financial crises are so prolonged – if they were not followed by the implementation
of the appropriate financial system reforms.
In addition, there is another reason financial crises might turn out to be
more sluggish than ordinary recessions – if monetary and fiscal policies were not
appropriately used. The effect of monetary and fiscal policies is explored in the
most recent World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2009). The authors find that monetary
and fiscal policies tend to shorten the duration of all types of recessions. Both
increases in government consumption and decreases of interest rates beyond what
is warranted by a Taylor rule positively and significantly affect recovery growth
9

rates. However, when only financial crises are analyzed the effect of monetary
policy is found not to be statistically significant. One drawback of this study is
that the sample for banking crises is limited to only fifteen episodes in developed
countries. This study is also related to the literature on the monetary policy
transmission mechanism. If the transmission mechanism is affected, then the
way monetary policy works could also be influenced. For example, the interestrate and the bank-lending channels could be hampered by the stress experienced
by the financial system, something that might lead to reduced effectiveness of
monetary policy (IMF, 2009a).
This paper attempts to add to the discussion of the sluggishness of
financial crises. It will build on previous work on the effects of monetary and
fiscal policies during banking crises (IMF, 2009). In particular, a larger sample
than used before will be employed to test whether the strength of the recovery and
the duration of the recession are affected by the policy response. In addition, the
impact of monetary policy will be examined in cases of forbearance. If the lack
of financial reforms proves to change the effectiveness of monetary policy, then
this might give another explanation why some countries take so long to recover
following a banking crisis. Finally, the extent to which fiscal and monetary
policies have been used in past financial crises is documented.
III.

Financial Crises and Past Policy Responses
Various studies analyze the link between the financial sector and the real

economy (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and Gertler, 2000; Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997). In this section, I review some of the existing literature that explains
how the financial sector can amplify output shocks, making a recession deeper
and more prolonged. Furthermore, I use a graphical version of a linearized
New Keynesian model that incorporates a risk premium and demonstrates the
10

difference between financial crises and ordinary recessions. Finally, I propose an
alternative explanation for the severity of financial crises – the policy response.
I argue that financial crises are often a time of immense political and economic
turmoil, something that often leads to the pursuit of non-Keynesian policies. In
addition to providing some possible explanations for the contractionary policies
countries have undertaken during financial crises, I review, in detail, the policy
response in twelve systemic banking crises. The episodes discussed suggest that
both developed and developing countries have pursued non-Keynesian policies
in the past.

Financial Crises: Why are They Different from Ordinary Recessions?
Some evidence has been found for Milton Friedman’s “plucking model”
which says that cyclical contractions tend to dissipate more quickly the larger the
size of the contraction (Sinclair, 2005). However, financial crises do not seem
to follow this pattern. They serve as an amplification mechanism that magnifies
and accompanies other types of shocks like exchange rate, domestic and foreign
debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a). An essential part of this amplification
mechanism is the asymmetric information problems that arise during a financial
crisis (Bernanke, 1983). Bernanke claims that the loss of confidence in financial
institutions and the widespread insolvency of debtors lead to increased cost of
credit intermediation, because banks cannot differentiate between good and bad
borrowers. Consequently, potential worthy borrowers cannot undertake their
projects; also savers have to devote their funds to inferior uses. As a result, there
is a contraction in economic activity.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) formulated a formal model that explains
how the financial system serves as an amplification mechanism to negative shocks
that hit the economy. The initial output shock leads to a decrease in wealth, which
11

makes firms more dependent on external financing. A weak banking system
cannot provide that financing, leading to a decline in investment. Kiyotaki and
Moore trace a similar dynamic in a richer intertemporal model (1997). A collapse
in land prices undermines a firm’s collateral, something that decreases its credit
limit. This causes it to pull back investment in assets and hurts it even more in the
next period.
The dynamics described above can be analyzed within an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model that includes a risk premium. The model has the
following equations (Clarida et al., 1999):
AS:

π –Et πt+1 = α(Yt –Ytn) + ut

IS:

Yt –Ytn = –γ[it-Et πt+1]+Et (Yt+1 –Ytn+1)+gt

TS:

r = f –Et πt+1+σ
This is a linearized version of a New Keynesian model (Clarida et al.,

1999). The AS curve is derived from the Euler equation of firms. It is referred to
as the New Keynesian Phillips curve. It shows a positive relationship between
prices and output, because an increase in output leads to higher real marginal
costs, which in turn make firms increase their prices. The parameters π, πe, Yt, Ytn
represent inflation, expected inflation, output and the natural level of output (the
level that will arise if prices are perfectly flexible). The parameter α refers to the
fraction of sticky-price firms. The larger this fraction is, the flatter the AS curve, and
correspondingly, the smaller change in price level economic fluctuations produce.
The last term of the AS curve, ut , is referred to as “cost push”, i.e. anything else
that might affect marginal costs. In addition, it is a random disturbance term that
follows an autoregressive pattern.
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The IS curve is derived from the consumption Euler equations of
households, that is the household’s optimal saving decision. In this equation the
current output gap depends on expected future output, Et (Yt+1–Ytn+1), and the
real interest rate – (it-Et πt+1). Higher expected future output raises the current
output, because consumers want to smooth consumption, and, therefore, consume
more today. In addition, the negative effect of the real interest rate reflects the
intertemporal substitution of consumption. The last term of the IS curve, gt, is
a function of expected changes in government purchases relative to expected
changes to potential output. Since gt shifts the IS curve, it is interpretable as a
demand shock (Clarida et al., 1999). Also, gt is a random disturbance term that
follows an autoregressive pattern.
Finally, the TS curve links the real risky rate, r, and the federal funds
rate, f. The parameter σ is the risk premium. Although, the optimization of the
monetary authority’s loss function is not a part of the model, it implicitly enters the
selection of the appropriate level of the federal funds rate f. The Fed’s stabilizing
policy rule makes it offset shocks to the risk premium or to expected inflation.
Recessions associated with financial crises can be analyzed within this
model. More importantly, the difference between those recessions and “ordinary”
recessions can be illustrated. In the model normal recessions are usually caused
by a leftward shift in the IS curve – a demand shock. For example, the demand
shock in the financial crisis of 2008 was the collapse of the housing market that
caused residential investment and consumption to fall. During times of financial
distress there is an additional factor at play – the risk/liquidity premium σ. A
jump in its value shifts the TS curve up, raising real interest rates on corporate
bonds, mortgages, and other risky assets. This is consistent with Bernanke’s
claim that higher cost of credit intermediation leads to increased interest rates
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or to a curtailment of credit (1983). In the model, the increased interest rates are
represented by the risk premium. The shift of the TS curve is also consistent with
the lowering of borrowers’ credit limits in Kiyotaki’s model, something that also
leads to higher interest rates (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
For example, at the start of the financial crisis of 2008 there was an
uncertainty associated with the solvency of various financial institutions. Also,
there was a huge fire sale of risky assets in an effort to raise cash. Such events
cause the TS curve to go up (the movement of the curve could be observed in the
equations above – as σ increases, r rises as well). An upward shift in the TS curve
leads in turn to a decrease in investment and consumption, causing output to fall

even further (illustrated by an upward movement along the IS curve). The graphs
fall even further (illustrated by an upward movement along the IS curve). The graphs b
below illustrate these dynamics:

illustrate these dynamics:
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recessions. In cases of financial distress, there is an additional force, illustrated in step (2), w

In step (1) the economy is undergoing a demand shock often responsible
for ordinary recessions. In cases of financial distress, there is an additional force,
illustrated in step (2), which is exacerbating the recession.
This model can be further used to illustrate how the policy response
can add to the severity of a financial crisis. Expansionary monetary policy is
represented by downward movements along the TS curve (the Fed optimizes
its loss function, choosing the appropriate level of f), which lead to downward
movements along the IS curve and correspondingly to higher output. Fiscal policy
acts through the IS curve – an increase in government spending shifts the IS
curve to the right, leading to an increase in output. Unconventional policies, like
measures to calm down financial markets, go through the TS curve. For example,
stress tests of the banking system lead to a decrease in σ, the risk premium, and
a downward shift of the TS curve. Also, quantitative easing can target the term
premium and also shift down the TS curve.
The model specified above is useful for distinguishing between financial
crises and ordinary recessions. Furthermore, it illustrates the possible impact
of monetary and fiscal policies. However, it does not differentiate between the
effectiveness of these policies in different environments. For example, Gali (2005)
and Eggertsson and Krugman (2010) demonstrate within a New Keynesian model
with heterogeneous agents that during times of financial crises the number of
credit constrained agents increases. As a result, government spending is effective
in raising the disposal income of those agents, something that makes them spend
more. In other words, these studies imply that fiscal policy might be more effective
during times of financial crises.
In addition, monetary policy might also have different effectiveness in
various environments. For example, if the transmission mechanism is affected
15

during a financial crisis, then the way monetary policy works might change.
The interest-rate and the bank-lending channels could be damaged by the stress
experienced in the financial system. (IMF, 2009a). Furthermore, if the economy
is in a liquidity trap, as during Japan’s 1997 recession, then traditional monetary
policy instruments are also not as effective as they would be under normal
circumstances.
Why is the Recovery Slow?
The recovery from a financial crisis is slower than that from an ordinary recession
for similar reasons. As Bernanke argues, it takes time to establish new or revive
old channels of credit (1983). Furthermore, it takes time to rehabilitate borrowers.
This last idea is further developed by Koo (2009). He argues that financial crises
are usually connected to “balance sheet” recessions. The last can result from a
shock to balance sheets – for example, a bubble burst – that often accompanies
financial crises. Then, it takes time for households and businesses to repair their
balance sheets. For example, Japan’s recovery during the “lost decade” was
prolonged as a result of an overhang of corporate debt. Similarly, an overhang of
household debt is probably holding down U.S. economic growth right now.
Why has the Policy Response in Past Financial Crises not been Keynesian?
The divergent policy responses to financial crises have their basis in the
fundamental theoretical disagreement about the effects of stabilization policies
that exists in the economic profession. Starting in the 1970s there was a shift in
economic thinking led in part by Edward Prescott that resulted in the formation of
New Classical economics. A main part of this shift was the idea that activist policies
to fight the business cycle are undesirable. This was because recessions result
from the rational decision of workers to work less when the economic conditions
are less favorable and, therefore, are the natural course of events. However, there
16

were still economists who believed that recessions are caused by demand side of
the economy – the New Keynesians. They worked to incorporate enough frictions
into the Real Business Cycle models of New Classical economists so that they can
bring the two camps closer together.
As Krugman argues, during the period 1980 – 2007 the clash between
the New Keynesians and New Classical economists was mainly on the basis of
theory and not action, because in the U.S. there was not much need to implement
expansionary policies, since recessions were relatively mild over that period. New
Keynesians thought that monetary policy was sufficient in managing the business
cycle. In contrast, New Classical economists thought that both expansionary fiscal
and monetary policy are ineffective, but did not mind the use of monetary policy.
A case in point of why disagreements in the economics profession matter
for policy is the recent global financial crisis. Farell (2011) argues that there were
noticeable shifts in the policy debate and implementation in the U.S. starting in
early 2010 that are attributable to the sovereign debt crises of Iceland and the
Baltic states. In particular, these crises provided conservative policy makers the
rhetorical fodder in the debate for more stringent fiscal policy. The intellectual
support those policy makers needed was, in turn, sought from economists; and the
disunited profession had what to offer. At the time various prominent economists
put forward arguments against further extending the stimulus. Examples of such
arguments are the work of Alesina and Ardagna (2010) supporting expansionary
austerity and the work of Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) on admissible government
debt thresholds.
In addition to the theoretical divide responsible for different approaches
crisis countries have undertaken in the past, there are some attractive beliefs
among policy makers that make them pursue non-Keynesian policies in the face
17

of financial and economic turmoil. For example, such a belief is the seemingly
logical argument that problems of excessive debt, too much private borrowing,
cannot be solved by creating even more of it – government borrowing (Krugman
and Eggertsson, 2010). During the Asian Financial Crisis the IMF advised some
of the crisis-stricken countries to pursue contractionary fiscal policies following
a similar argument. The intention was to “restore confidence” by convincing the
markets that irresponsible behavior is a thing of the past. For similar reasons,
money market rates were increased and unnecessary structural reforms were
undertaken (Krugman, 2010). Tightened monetary policy was aimed at convincing
the markets that the pegged exchange system will be preserved. Some of the
structural reforms had no particular connection to the crisis but they were also
aimed at calming down the markets. A typical example of IMF-advised policies
was what Korea did in 1997. Money market rates were raised up to 25.6 percent
in M1, 1998. Furthermore, there was an initial tightening of fiscal polcy to rebuild
confidence (for half a year).
Furthermore, there might be institutional reasons for some countries’
inability to pursue Keynesian policies – Kaminsky et al. argue that developing
countries face credit constraints during bad times that prevent them from borrowing
(2004). Furthermore, developing countries tend to also follow procyclical policies
during good times, meaning that they do not have the necessary cushion to fight
recessions.
Advanced countries are not immune to institutional problems. Central
banks in some developed countries have become increasingly conservative
in the past two decades, focusing too much on inflation, and this might have its
consequences during severe recessions (Krugman, 2010). A recent IMF study of 25
severe recessions in advanced economies finds that prolonged periods of economic
weakness are associated with falling inflation rates (Meier, 2010). However, it also
18

finds that as the inflation rate goes toward zero, it becomes sticky. This means that
a severely depressed economy can still have a positive inflation rate – most likely
because of downward nominal rigidities and well-anchored inflation expectations.
A central bank that is overly focused on inflation might miss the urgency of the
situation and not act as aggressive as necessary (Krugman, 2010).
Finally, there is an additional reason why some countries cannot further
stimulate a depressed economy – the liquidity trap. Such an environment was
observed in Japan in the 1990s and is currently the reality in U.S.

IV.

Modeling
The effect of monetary policy during recessions on the ensuing recoveries is

first analyzed on the background of countries, experiencing “ordinary” recessions.
This is meant to serve as a benchmark. Then, the effect of monetary policy is
analyzed in countries undergoing banking crises.
Monetary Policy in Ordinary Recessions
The goal is to see if recovery growth rates after ordinary recessions
are significantly affected by monetary policies. For that purpose a fixed effects
model is used (IMF, 2009a). The reason for this is to capture the effect of any
unobservable country-level characteristics that pertain to the recessions and
recoveries experienced. For example, a country with an export-oriented economy
might be able to faster drag itself out of a recession. Such an occurrence would
be captured by the fixed-effects model assuming that throughout the period under
consideration the export industry has held a similar role. In particular, the model
estimated is:
RecGrowthi ,t= c0+c1*Amplitudei ,t + c2*Durationi ,t + c3*MPi ,t+ c4*CAGCi ,t+ + ei ,t (1)
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The dependent variable is the recovery growth rate one year after the
trough of the recession. I control for the amplitude and duration of the recession
– these are characteristics of the business cycle itself that might differ within
a certain country over time. For example, there is nothing to make us believe
that external shocks which hit an economy should be of the same size. Milton
Friedman’s “plucking model”, which has been empirically verified, suggests
that the coefficient estimate on Amplitude, c1, should be positive – the deeper
the recession, the stronger the recovery. Furthermore, I expect that prolonged
recessions have slower recoveries. As a result, the coefficient estimate on
Duration, c2, is conjectured to be negative. Duration is measured in quarters.
The monetary policy response over the recession period, the variable
MP, is measured as the sum of the residuals of a monetary policy rule over each
quarter over the recession period. I expect that countries that increased interest
rates above what is warranted by a Taylor rule experienced slower recoveries. As
a results, the coefficient estimate on MP, c3 ,is conjectured to be negative.
As mentioned, monetary policy shocks are identified from the residuals
of a monetary policy rule. For that purpose, following the methodology of the
latest issue of the World Economic Outlook, a Taylor rule of the following form
was estimated for each country:
it=b0+b1*dummy_85+ b2*πt+ b3*gapt+ ut,
where it is the nominal interest rate, dummy_85 is a dummy for periods after 1985
(to allow for a shift in equilibrium rates), πt is the inflation rate and gapt is a
measure of the output gap (potential GDP is measured using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter). Using the real interest rate as the dependent variable does not change the
results, since inflation is included in the model.
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The fiscal policy response over the recession period, the variable CAGC, is
cyclically adjusted government consumption. I expect that an increase in this variable
will lead to a higher growth rate of the recovery. Therefore, c4should be positive.
Again, the methodology of the World Economic Outlook is used. First, the elasticity
of government consumption with respect to the business cycle is estimated:
lngct=d0+d1*gapt+ d2*trend+ et.
As above, gapt is a measure of the output gap. Trend is a time trend. Second, the
cyclically adjusted government consumption is computed as:
CAGCt=gct(1-d1*gapt).
In addition to the above estimations, a check for the robustness of the results
is performed. The duration of the recession is used as dependent variables in some of
the estimations to see if the effects of the monetary and fiscal policies change.
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of the
recession and the strength of the recovery following financial crises are analyzed.
In addition, monetary policy is examined in cases of forbearance - banks left to
function despite being technically insolvent, and prudential regulations (such as
for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) suspended or not fully applied.
If forbearance has a negative effect on the effectiveness of monetary policy, then
insufficient use and diminished effectiveness of an otherwise powerful tool for
stimulating recoveries might be responsible for the sluggishness of some financial
crisis episodes. Data for forbearance is available only for about thirty five countries
(Laeven and Valencia, 2010), while the sample of all financial crises includes
about eighty countries. Consequently, two different estimations are performed.
The model that includes forbearance is:
R e c G ro w t h = c 0 + c 1 * A m p l i t u d e + c 2 * D u r a t i o n + c 3 * M P + c 4 * M P F o r b +
c5*Forbearance + c6*GDP(-1) + e (2)
21

The variables RecGrowth, Amplitude, and Duration are the selfexplanatory. They are measured as the recovery growth rate one year after the
trough of the recession, the sum of GDP growth rates during the recession, and
the duration of the recession in quarters.
Monetary policy is measured as the change in real money market rates
over the course of the recession. If money market rates are not available, then their
closest substitute is used. The reason for the difference from before is the usage
of yearly data. Estimating residuals from a Taylor rule would be too imprecise
with yearly data. A decrease in interest rates would mean that there is a negative
change in real money market rates. Therefore, we are testing if c3, the coefficient
estimate on the monetary policy measure, is negative. Note that the dependent
variable is the growth rate, or the output gap, in the recovery phase, which is at
least one year after the implementation of monetary policies; this would eliminate
any endogeneity problems.
In addition to the measure for monetary policy, the regression equation
includes an interaction term between the changes in real interest rates and
forbearance. Forbearance is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not there
is regulatory forbearance during the years [t, t+3], where t denotes the starting
year of the crisis. This variable is based on a qualitative assessment of information
contained in IMF Staff Reports (Laeen and Valencia). As part of this assessment,
information is collected on whether or not banks were permitted to continue
functioning despite being technically insolvent, and whether or not prudential
regulations (such as for loan classification and loan loss provisioning) were
suspended or not fully applied during the first three years of the crisis.
The interaction term is supposed to estimate whether in cases of
forbearance the effect of monetary policy is reduced. Previous experience has
22

suggested that this might be the case. For example, many observers consider the
policies undertaken by Sweden in the early 1990s to have been highly effective
in restoring the health of the financial system and paving the way for a strong
recovery through extensive use of expansionary policies (IMF, 2009). In contrast,
in Japan, slow recognition of the bad-loan problem contributed to a sluggish
recovery from the financial crisis, even though interest rates were at the zero
bound. The effectiveness of monetary policy might be disrupted if the interest
rate and credit channels of the monetary policy transmission mechanism are not
properly working during a banking crisis.
In other words, the coefficient estimate on MPForb is expected to be
positive. The marginal impact of MP is given by c3+c4*Forb. We expect that c3
would be negative. Therefore, if forbearance diminishes the effect of monetary
policy it should be making the whole term bigger (“less negative”). This would
mean that we are testing whether the coefficient estimate on MPForb, c4, is positive.
Finally, forbearance is also included in the model. We would expect that if
the authorities do not address and act on failing banking institutions, then this would
have a direct negative effect on the economy. However, it is not particularly clear
how long lasting this deleterious impact might be. Generally, we would expect that
recovery growth rates might be negatively affected by forbearance. Therefore, we
are testing to see if the coefficient estimate of Forbearance, c5, is negative.
The estimated model without forbearance would look like:
RecGrowth=c0+c1*Amplitude+c2*Duration+c3*MP+c4*GC+c5*GDP(-1)+e (3)

The definition of the variables is the same as above. The only difference
is that the government consumption variable is added. In particular, fiscal policy
is proxied by the percentage change in government consumption. This measure
is used instead of the fiscal balance, because the last would cause endogeneity. A
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change in output affects the fiscal balance (it is a fraction of output) and a change
in the fiscal balance affects output. An increase in government consumption
during the recession phase is expected to positively affect recovery growth
rates. Therefore, we are testing if c4, the coefficient estimate on the change in
government consumption, is positive.
In addition to the above estimations, a couple of robustness checks are
performed. The duration of the recession and the output gap one year after the end
of the recession are used as dependent variables.
Data
In getting a better understanding of the recovery that will follow the 2008-09
recession through the lenses of historical experience we have two choices. We can
either draw conclusions from the financial crises that occurred during the 1930s,
or look at the ones that have plagued the world in the past forty years. The reason
for this is the striking pattern of occurrence of financial crises worldwide. From
the 1940s up to the early 1970s, there were almost no banking crises in the world.1
However, with the financial and international capital account liberalization of the
1970s, banking crises have re-emerged (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a).
This paper focuses on the period 1970-2005 and it uses two distinct data sets.
The first one consists of data on recessions and recoveries in a set of advanced
countries. The countries are those identified in the Statistical Appendix of the
2010 issue of the World Economic Outlook as advanced. Then, subject to data
availability the monetary and fiscal policy responses during all of the recessions
since 1970 in the selected countries are analyzed. Quarterly data is used. To
1

Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argue that this calm might be partly explained by booming world
growth, but perhaps more so by the repression of the domestic financial markets (in varying degrees) and the heavy-handed use of capital controls followed for many years after WWII.
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measure the stance of monetary and fiscal policies money market rates and
government consumption are employed. The main source of the data is the
International Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Given that only a few of the
countries have data going back before 1977 this limits the sample.
The procedure for identifying business cycles is an algorithm called BBQ
(Bry and Boschan procedure for quarterly data; see Harding and Pagan, 2002).
A MATLAB version of a program that imitates the algorithm can be found at
www.ncer.edu.au. It uses quarterly output data to identify peaks and troughs.
A complete cycle goes from one peak to the next peak with its two phases the
contraction phase (from peak to trough) and the expansion phase (from trough to
peak). The algorithm requires that the minimum duration of the complete cycle
and each phase must be at least five and two quarters, respectively. Table1 in the
appendix shows the recessions (peak-to-trough) identified by this algorithm.
The second dataset consists of eighty financial crisis episodes in both
developed and developing countries. Laeven and Valencia identify 124 systemic
banking crises between 1970 and 2007 (2008). Data on real GDP, inflation,
government consumption and interest rates is collected from the International
Financial Statistics database of the IMF. Eighty of the 124 crisis episodes had
output data available. Furthermore, of those eighty countries not all have both
government consumption and interest rates data available. As a result, the sample
is limited to less than eighty countries in the various regressions below. To measure
the stance of monetary and fiscal policy money market rates and government
consumption are used. Wherever money market rates are unavailable, their closest
substitute is used. Data on forbearance is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2010)
and it is limited to about 35 countries for which the authors provide information
on various financial policies undertaken. All data is yearly.
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Figures 1 and 2, in the appendix, describe the output dynamics and duration
of recessions associated with financial crises. Those recessions are particularly
severe – the amplitude of the recession is on average about four percent of real
GDP and the mean duration is about five quarters. In addition, seventy percent
of the crisis periods considered have a duration of one year or more. The policy
response in those crises is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Monetary policy, proxied
by the change in money market rates, seems to be expansionary – real interest
rates have declined during both the first year and the whole duration of the crisis.
However, these declines can be mainly explained by the inflationary dynamics in
the countries and not by the explicit behavior of policy makers. Figure 3 shows
that nominal interest rates have actually increased slightly. On the contrary, fiscal
policy, proxied by the change in government consumption, seems to be markedly
procyclical. Approximately one half of the crisis episodes were characterized by a
negative change in government consumption during the duration of the recession.
Note that government consumption data is available for 78 out of the 80 countries
under consideration. That number for interest rates is 70.
The start of the financial crises themselves is taken from Laeven and
Valencia (2008). The peaks of the recessions are identified using a one-year
window around the start of the financial crisis. In this way, it is ensured that the
recessions under consideration are, in fact, associated with the financial crises.
Note, however, that in some of the crisis periods there was no output loss – in
those cases, following Cecchetti et al. (2010) the duration and the amplitude of the
recession are set equal to zero. Table 2, in the appendix, shows the start of each of
the banking crises under consideration (Laeven and Valencia, 2008).
V.

Empirical Evidence
The effects of monetary and fiscal policies during recessions on the ensuing
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recoveries are first analyzed in the sample of advanced countries, experiencing
“ordinary” recessions. Then, the effects of monetary and fiscal policies are
analyzed in the sample of countries undergoing banking crises.
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Ordinary Recessions
The table below shows the regression results from estimating the
fixed effects model specified above – regressions (3) and (4). In addition to this
model, one is estimated with a dependant variable the duration of the recession –
regressions (1) and (2). The results of the two sets of models are largely consistent.
The same set of variables is statistically significant in both of them. Also, the
estimations without fixed effects in both cases have a much smaller explanatory
power than the ones with fixed effects.
Table 3 – Results for the severity and sluggishness of ordinary recessions.
(1)
(2)
Duration			
			
Amplitude
-.109
-.133
(-0.91)
(-3.00)***
RealRate
5.39
4.93
(2.60)**
(2.72)***
GC
.134
.006
(1.50)
(0.22)

(3)
-.024
(-.13)
-.488***
(-3.19)
-4.207
(-2.43)***
.120
(.373)

(4)
-.077
(-0.46)
-.130
(-1.47)
-1.005
(-.62)
.008
(.18)

Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Yes
74
0.40

No
66
0.04

Yes
66
0.41

No
66
0.30

Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, ***
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors
used. The dependent variable in (1) and (2) is the duration of the recession. The dependent
variable in (3) and (4) is the recovery growth rate one year after the trough of the recession.

Looking at regression numbered (3) we see that the recession amplitude
has a statistically significant effect on the growth rate in the recovery phase. The
coefficient estimate is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1
percent level of significance. Note that amplitude measures the percentage decline
in GDP during the recession phase – peak to trough. This result suggests that
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the steeper the recession, the faster the recovery. Furthermore, as expected the
coefficient estimate on the RealRate is also statistically significant in difference
from zero – at the five percent level of significance. As previously noted the
RealRate is the sum of the impulses relative to the policy rule for each quarter over
the recession period. In other words, RealRate represents the sum of the residuals
from an estimated monetary policy rule. This would mean that an increase in the
RealRate corresponds to an increase in money market rates above what a policy
rule warrants. Therefore, as expected the coefficient estimate is negative. However,
government consumption does not significantly affect recovery growth rates. One
reason for this occurrence might be that the estimation does not account for the
level of government debt, something found to be important for the effectiveness
of fiscal policy (IMF, 2009). Furthermore, as Krugman and Eggertsson (2010)
argue, the effect of fiscal policy is the biggest when there are credit constrained
agents in the economy – as during a financial crisis.
The coefficient estimates agree in magnitude with those estimates in
previous studies (IMF, 2009). In addition, the R-squared of the fixed effects
model is pretty high, 40 percent, given that the dependent variable is growth rates
one year after the recession has occurred. However, the R-squared of the model
without the fixed effects is rather low – less than 4 percent of the variation of the
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables included.
The estimation that has the duration of the recession as the dependent
variable (regression equation (1) also suggests that monetary policy significantly
affects the length of the recession.
Monetary Policy in Financial Crises
The table below shows the regression results from estimating the model
for financial crises. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of
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the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough
of the recession. The results of these three models are consistent with each other.
In models (1), (2) and (3) increases in government consumption have a significant
negative effect on the duration of the recession and a significant positive effect on
recovery growth rates. The growth rate of GDP prior to the recession also seems
to matter (regression equations (1) and (2)). Countries with higher prior growth
rates tend to have stronger recoveries and shorter recessions.
Table 2 – Results for severity and sluggishness of banking crises.
(1)
Duration		
		
Amplitude		
		
Real GDP (-1)
-.428
(-1.77)*
RealRate
0.011
(0.32)
Cum.Gov.Con.
-.125
(-3.74)***

(2)
-.058
(-.62)
-.066
(0.33)
.232
(1.86)*
.011
(0.50)
.066
(2.06)**

(3)
-.003
(-4.82)***

Observations
R-squared

65
0.14

66
0.40

66
0.17

-.0003
(0.86)
-.0003
(-.79)
.001
(3.23)***

Notes: unbalanced panel with country fixed effects. t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, ***
denote level of significance indicating 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard
errors used. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of the recession, the
recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession.

However, monetary policy does not significantly affect recovery growth
rates, output gaps and duration of the recession. This might be due to the reduced
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanism during times of
financial distress (IMF, 2009). The same results hold whether real or nominal
rates are used. Furthermore, it does not make a differenceifthe cumulative change
in interest rates over the whole duration of the recession is used or the change in
the first year of the crisis. There have been reversals of policy, especially in the
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crises that involve currency upheavals like the ones in the Asian Financial crisis
so such a check makes sense.
As explained before, the effectiveness of monetary policy might be
affected by the extent to which financial reforms were implemented in the affected
countries. To formally test this hypothesis, a smaller sample of countries is used, for
which data on forbearance is available. Forbearance is the qualitative assessment
of whether banks were permitted to continue functioning despite being technically
insolvent. The regressions below try to assess the impact of forbearance. Again,
three dependent variables are used – the duration of the recession, the recovery
growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the recession.
Table 3 – Results for the effect of monetary policy in the case of forbearance during
banking crises.
(1)
Duration		
		
Amplitude		
Real GDP (-1)
RealRate
RealRate*Forb.
Forb.
Observations
R-squared

-.060
(-0.27)
-.034
(0.59)
.06
(0.92)
-1.35
(2.07)**

(2)
-.052
(-0.40)
-.018
(-0.18)
.006
(0.964)
.004
(0.92)
.092
(1.30)
2.42
(-1.16)

(3)
-.004
(-2.98)***
-.0008
(-0.37)
-.0026***
(-4.34)
.020
(2.70)**
-.020			
(-0.55)

30
.03

30
0.27

30
0.47

Notes: t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** denote level of significance indicating 10%,
5% and 1% respectively. The dependent variables in (1), (2) and (3) are the duration of
the recession, the recovery growth rate and the output gap one year after the trough of the
recession. Robust standard errors used.

The coefficient estimates in the model that has recovery growth rates as a
dependent variable are statistically insignificant in difference from zero. However,
in the estimation using the output gap as the dependent variable, the change in
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money market rates is statistically significant. An increase in money market rates
leads to a decrease in the output gap. Furthermore, forbearance dampens the
effect of monetary policy as indicated by the negative coefficient estimate on
RealRate*Forb. Also, this diminishing effect seems to be quite significant as it
is bigger in magnitude than the positive effect of monetary policy on recovery
growth rates. The lack of explanatory power of the independent variables in the
model with recovery growth rates as the regressand agrees with previous studies
which find that recovery growth rates are harder to predict than output gaps (IMF,
2009). Furthermore, we can see that the estimation with duration as the dependent
variable also lacks statistical significance. This might be explained with the
fact that forbearance is defined over the three years following the beginning of
the recession. As a result, its effect might not be felt during the duration of the
recession.
In summary, the empirical results suggest differences between the effects of
monetary and fiscal policies on the duration of recessions and the strength of
recoveries in ordinary recessions and in systemic financial crises. During ordinary
recessions expansionary monetary policy seems to be a powerful tool, generating
significant increases in recovery growth rates. During recessions associated with
financial crises, expansionary monetary policy still has a significant effect on the
strength of the recovery. However, this effect is dependent on the implementation
of prompt financial policies, and in particular, on intervention with insolvent
financial institutions. The effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a
powerful tool during banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect
recovery growth rates during ordinary recessions.
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VI.

Conclusions
Non-Keynesian policies in the face of a financial crisis are not a thing of

the past. A number of advanced economies have pursued contractionary policies
in the most recent financial crisis. This has certainly been the case in Europe.
Many countries there embraced austerity in the face of a slumping economy –
France, Britain and Ireland, for example. In addition, some EU members had to
settle with insufficiently expansionary monetary policies, because of the outsized
influence of Germany over the European Central bank and the better performance
of the German economy. While policies in the U.S. have been more favorable
towards sustaining a recovery, this has not come without much debate. Ideas and
arguments supporting fiscal retrenchment have abounded. This is exemplified in
the work of some prominent economists like that of Alesina and Ardagna (2009).
The political climate has also been antagonistic towards some of the actions
policy makers have tried to undertake. For example, there was a huge backlash
against the quantitative easing program the Fed started to implement in late 2010
– something that can have a particularly deleterious effect when the economy is
in the midst of a liquidity trap and when the Fed’s credibility in influencing the
public’s expectations is the main tool out (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2011).
In this paper, I use two different samples with data from 1970 to 2005 to
study the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on the profiles of recessions and
recoveries. In other words, I ask whether pursuing non-Keynesian policies has
mattered during past financial crises. Several results emerged from the econometric
analysis. First, monetary policy during ordinary recessions and banking crises is a
powerful tool with lasting effects that extend to recovery growth rates. However,
the effect of monetary policy during financial crises is strongly diminished in the
case of forbearance – banks left to function despite being technically insolvent.
Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is reversed – it is a powerful tool during
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banking crises, but it does not seem to significantly affect recovery growth rates
during ordinary recessions. Finally, the policy response during past financial crisis
does not seem to be particularly expansionary – on the contrary, fiscal policy is
markedly procyclical, while monetary policy is neutral. In summary, the results
suggest it is possible that inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies and the lack
of financial reforms could be one reason why recoveries associated with financial
crises turn out to be particularly protracted.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) argue that both advanced and developing
countries suffer from the “this time is different” syndrome when it comes to
financial crises, because policy makers and the public tend to believe that they
are immune from a crisis due to some circumstances that make them special.

2

This paper suggests that this syndrome should be avoided when it comes to policy
as well. This time is not different and expansionary policies should be pursued.
Past financial crises have been so protracted in part because of the embracement
of austerity and in part because of the lack of realization that financial crises are
inherently more severe.

2 An example of that line of thinking involves the securitization process of mortgage backed securities in the U.S. prior to the most recent recession. People thought that these new “synthetic” products have managed to practically eliminate all risk from the economy. With the benefit of hindsight,
we know that this was not the case.
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Figure 1: Output Dynamics in Banking Crises (growth rates)
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Figure 2: Duration of Banking Crises (in years)
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Figure 3: Change in Interest Rates (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough)
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Figure 4: Change in Government Consumption (first year of crisis and peak-to-trough)
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Table 1: Recessions in Advanced Countries (peaks and troughs)
Country

Peak

Trough

Australia

1960 Q3

1961 Q3

Australia

1965 Q2

1966 Q1

Australia

1971 Q3

1972 Q1

Australia

1975 Q2

1976

Australia

1977 Q2

1978

Australia

1981 Q3

1983 Q2

Australia

1990 Q2

1991 Q2

Austria

1978

1979 Q1

Austria

1981

1982 Q1

Austria

1984

1985 Q1

Austria

2001

2002 Q1

Belgium

1982

1983 Q1

Belgium

1992

1993 Q1

Belgium

1998

1998 Q3

Canada

1980 Q1

1980 Q3

Canada

1981 Q2

1983

Canada

1990 Q1

1991 Q1

Denmark

1977 Q3

1978 Q1

Denmark

1980

1981 Q1

Denmark

1988

1988 Q3

Denmark

1993

1993 Q3

Denmark

1995

1995 Q3

Denmark

2002

2003 Q1

Denmark

2005

2006 Q1

France

1974 Q3

1975 Q1

France

1992 Q3

1993 Q2

Germany

1962 Q3

1963 Q1

Germany

1966 Q3

1967 Q2

Germany

1974 Q1

1975 Q2

Germany

1978

1978 Q2

Germany

1980 Q1

1982 Q3

Germany

1992 Q1

1993 Q1

Germany

1995 Q3

1996 Q1

Germany

2002 Q3

2003 Q2

Italy

1981

1981 Q3
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Italy

1982 Q1

1983

Italy

1992 Q1

1993 Q3

Italy

1996 Q1

1997

Italy

2001 Q1

2002

Italy

2003

2003 Q2

Italy

2004 Q3

2005 Q1

Japan

1974

1975 Q1

Japan

1993 Q1

1993 Q3

Japan (financial crisis)

1997 Q1

1999 Q1

Japan

2001 Q1

2002

Netherlands

1980 Q1

1981 Q3

Netherlands

1982 Q1

1983 Q1

Netherlands

2001 Q2

2002 Q1

Portugal

1978

1978 Q2

Portugal

1981 Q2

1982 Q1

Portugal

1983

1984 Q1

Portugal

1992 Q1

1993 Q1

Portugal

2002

2003 Q1

Portugal

2005 Q2

2007 Q1

Spain

1975

1975 Q2

Spain (financial crisis)

1978 Q3

1979 Q1

Spain

1981

1981 Q2

Spain

1992 Q1

1993 Q2

Switzerland

1981 Q2

1983

Switzerland

1986 Q2

1987

Switzerland

1990 Q3

1991 Q2

Switzerland

1992 Q1

1993 Q1

Switzerland

1996 Q1

1996 Q3

Switzerland

2002 Q2

2003 Q2

United Kingdom

1961 Q2

1962

United Kingdom

1973 Q2

1974 Q1

United Kingdom

1974 Q3

1975 Q3

United Kingdom

1979 Q2

1981 Q1

United Kingdom

1990 Q2

1991 Q3

USA

1969 Q3

1971

USA

1974

1975 Q1

USA

1980 Q1

1980 Q3

USA

1981 Q3

1982 Q1

USA

1990 Q2

1991 Q1
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Table 2: Financial Crises included in the sample (Laeven and Valencia, 2008)

Table
Table
2: Table
Financial
2: Financial
2: Financial
Crises
Crises
included
Crises
included
included
in the
insample
the
insample
the(Laeven
sample
(Laeven
and
(Laeven
Valencia,
and Valencia,
and Valencia,
2008)2008)
2008)

Start Start
of Start
of ofDominican
Dominican
Dominican
Republic
Republic
Republic
2003 20032003Norway
Norway
Norway
Country
Country
CountryFinancial
Financial
Financial
Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
1998
1998
1998
Panama
Panama
Panama
CrisisCrisisCrisis
Ecuador
Ecuador
Ecuador
1982 19821982Paraguay
Paraguay
Paraguay
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
2001 20012001
Finland
Finland
Finland
1991 19911991Peru Peru Peru
Argentina
Argentina
Argentina
1995 19951995
Ghana
Ghana
Ghana
1982 19821982Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
Bangladesh
1987 19871987
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau 1995 19951995Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
BeninBeninBenin
1988 19881988
Guyana
Guyana
Guyana
1993 19931993Poland
Poland
Poland
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
1986 19861986
Hungary
Hungary
Hungary
1991 19911991Russia
Russia
Russia
Bolivia
Bolivia
Bolivia
1994 19941994
India IndiaIndia
1993 19931993Senegal
Senegal
Senegal
BrazilBrazilBrazil
1990 19901990
Indonesia
Indonesia
Indonesia
1997 19971997Slovak
Slovak
Republic
Slovak
Republic
Republic
BraziBraziBrazi
1994 19941994
Jamaica
Jamaica
Jamaica
1996 19961996SpainSpainSpain
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
1996 19961996
JapanJapanJapan
1997 19971997Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Burkina
Burkina
Faso
Burkina
Faso Faso
1990 19901990
Jordan
Jordan
Jordan
1989 19891989Swaziland
Swaziland
Swaziland
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
1994 19941994
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
1985 19851985Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Cameroon
Cameroon
Cameroon
1987 19871987
Kenya
Kenya
Kenya
1992 19921992Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Cameroon
Cameroon
Cameroon
1995 19951995
KoreaKoreaKorea
1997 19971997Thailand
Thailand
Thailand
Cape Cape
Verde
Cape
VerdeVerde
1993 19931993
Kuwait
Kuwait
Kuwait
1982 19821982TogoTogoTogo
Central
Central
African
Central
African
Rep.
African
Rep. Rep.
1995 19951995
LatviaLatvia
Latvia
1995 19951995Tunisia
Tunisia
Tunisia
ChadChadChad
1992 19921992
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania
1995 19951995Turkey
Turkey
Turkey
ChileChileChile
1981 19811981
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
1988 19881988Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
ChileChileChile
1976 19761976
Malaysia
Malaysia
Malaysia
1997 19971997United
United
States
United
StatesStates
China,
China,
P.R.
China,
P.R. P.R.
1998 19981998
Mali Mali Mali
1987 19871987Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Colombia
Colombia
Colombia
1998 19981998
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
1994 19941994Uruguay
Uruguay
Uruguay
Colombia
Colombia
Colombia
1982 19821982
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
1981 19811981Venezuela
Venezuela
Venezuela
Congo,
Congo,
Republic
Congo,
Republic
of
Republic
of of
1992 19921992
Morocco
Morocco
Morocco
1980 19801980Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam
CostaCosta
RicaCosta
Rica Rica
1987 19871987
Mozambique
Mozambique
Mozambique
1987 19871987Yemen
Yemen
Yemen
CostaCosta
RicaCosta
Rica Rica
1994 19941994
NepalNepalNepal
1988 19881988Zambia
Zambia
Zambia
Croatia
Croatia
Croatia
1998 19981998
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
2000 20002000Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe
CzechCzech
Republic
Czech
Republic
Republic 1996 19961996
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
1991 19911991
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1991 19911991
1988 19881988
1995 19951995
1983 19831983
1983 19831983
1997 19971997
1992 19921992
1998 19981998
1988 19881988
1998 19981998
1977 19771977
1989 19891989
1995 19951995
1991 19911991
1997 19971997
1983 19831983
1993 19931993
1991 19911991
2000 20002000
1994 19941994
1988 19881988
1981 19811981
2002 20022002
1994 19941994
1997 19971997
1996 19961996
1995 19951995
1995 19951995

